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DEVOLUTION OR DISUNION:
THE CONSTITUTION AFTER
MEECH LAKE0
BY

CALVIN MASSEY*

Professor Massey discusses the theoretical benefits of decentralized
federalism and proposes constitutional changes to obtain those benefits
and to respond to the disparate aspirations of the Canadian polity. He
proposes that the provinces and federal government share concurrent
authority over most powers, with provincial legislation paramount in cases
of conflict. He suggests an empowered Senate, partially selected by the
provinces and partially appointed by the federal government, aboriginal
self-government, and territorial Senate representation. Finally, Massey
proposes altering the constitutional amending formula to enhance public
participation and facilitate amendment where unanimity is not critical.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nations are not, like caribou, beavers or eagles, natural
phenomena; nations are social and political inventions, the products
of particular historical and cultural circumstances. The invention of
the Canadian nation is an unfinished work, so it should come as no
surprise to remark that the constitution, which "[i]n its largest sense
... makes fundamental and authoritative statements about who
Canadians are as a people,"1 is equally unfinished. The direction of
its development after the demise of the Meech Lake Accord will
have a profound and lasting impact on the national identity of
Canada. It is critically important that visions of the constitutional
future be fully explored.
This article attempts to sketch out such a vision. That is a
tall order for anyone and a bit presumptuous of a single person to
take on the task without invitation. It is even cheekier for an
American to do so, since part of the Canadian national identity is

1 A. Cairns, 'Ritual, Taboo, and Bias in Constitutional Controversies in Canada, or
Constitutional Talk Canadian Style" (1990) 54 Sask. L Rev. 121 at 122.
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bound up in being something other than an American. There are,
however, some advantages to the outsider's perspective, since the
outsider is spared much of the personal agony of the current turmoil
produced by the deep linguistic and cultural divisions within
Canada.2
Meech Lake began as the "Quebec Round" of constitutional
negotiation, with a single ambition of reconciling Quebec to the
Constitution Act, 1982.! But through the process of executive
federalism taken to an extreme, the Premiers could not resist turning
the negotiations into the "Provincial Round." Flushed with the
desire to reach agreement, the Prime Minister failed to stem those
divergent parochial interests. In the event, these decisions may have
been major mistakes, but I have no wish to dissect the corpse of
Meech Lake. Rather, the point of the observation is that postMeech Lake constitutional solutions that successfully respond to
Quebec must also respond to the regional and cultural aspirations
which turned Meech Lake from the Quebec round to the provincial
round.
Constitutional developments in the aftermath of the death of
Meech Lake have moved at a steady, if not breathtaking, pace. The
Allaire Report and the recommendations of the Belang6r-Campeau
Commission make plain that Quebec demands a substantial
renegotiation of the Constitution, devolving enormous power upon
Prime
Quebec as the price for remaining within confederation
Minister Mulroney's reaction to these demands admits the necessity
of constitutional modification devolving additional authority upon

2 1 confess I am not entirely an outsider and so cannot claim complete dispassion. I
spend as much of each year as possible living in a bucolic part of British Columbia. As a
result, my five year old daughter thinks the 4th of July is called "America Day," but finds it
a pallid imitation of the real item: Canada Day. She is unaware of the existence of Fete du
Ste. Jean Baptiste, and B.C. Day is just the August weekend all the tourists arrive. Perhaps
this is symbolic of the evolving national identity of Canada, but it is more likely symbolic of
my mixed status as both outsider and quasi-Western Canadian.
3 Being Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. See also A. Cohen, A
Deal Undone: The Making and Breaking of the Meech Lake Accord (Vancouver. Douglas &
McIntyre, 1990) at 1-18, 71-117.
4 Liberal Party of Canada, A Quebec Free to Choose: Report of the Quebec Liberal Party
(The Allaire Report) (Quebec: Liberal Party, 1991) and Quebec, L'avenirpolitiqueet constitut-

ionnel du Quebec (Belangr-CampeauReport) (Quebec: La Commission, 1991).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[yoi- 29 No. 4

all provinces, yet contends that the amount of such devolution,
necessary or desirable, is considerably less than that demanded by
Quebec.5 Public opinion polls suggest that unprecedented numbers6
of Quebecers support some form of increased Quebec autonomy.
It does not seem to overstate the case to contend that Canada faces
a constitutional Hobson's choice: devolution or disunion. In this
article, I hope to accomplish two objectives: provide a theoretical
justification for a decentralized federal union and make a set of
concrete proposals concerning constitutional change which
compromise the desires of ardent centralists, Quebec, Western
Canada and other regional interests, and indigenous peoples. There
is, of course, little reason to think that my proposal will prove any
more appealing or efficacious than any of the competing suggestions.
Nevertheless, I offer it in the modest hope that the greater the
number of proposals which seek to preserve confederation, the more
likely that some formula can be found which will in fact do so. I do
not conceal my bias; I do not wish to see Quebec and Canada living
in separate houses. Of course, should all efforts fail and Quebec
depart confederation, an entirely different set of constitutional
problems will emerge. I make little sustained effort in this article to
deal with those speculative matters, but proceed on the assumption
that it is desirable to forge a lasting union of Canada and Quebec.
At risk of oversimplification, it might be claimed that the
Canadian Constitution incorporates three basic principles:
parliamentary government, federalism, and, since 1982, a judicially

5 See N. Wood & A. Wilson-Smith, "Mulroney's Counterattack" Maclean's (18 February
1991) 18.
6 See C. Wood, "A Nation on the Brink" Maclean's (7 January 1991) 18. According to
a Maclean's/Decima public opinion poll, 78 per cent of Quebecers preferred one of the
following options: political and economic independence for all provinces (11 per cent),
political independence for all provinces within a customs union (27 per cent), special powers
for Quebec alone within confederation (22 per cent), and enhanced powers for all provinces
within confederation (18 per cent). By contrast, while 67 per cent of Canadians outside
Quebec preferred one of these options, the breakdown within the options was quite different:
political and economic independence for all provinces (5 per cent), political independence
for all provinces within a customs union (14 per cent), special powers for Quebec alone
within confederation (3 per cent), and enhanced powers for all provinces within confederation
(41 per cent). Compare D. Kilgour, Inside Outer Canada (Edmonton: Lone Pine Publishing,
1990) at 198.
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enforceable and legally paramount Charterof Rights and Freedoms.7
Each of these constitutional jewels has a number of facets.
Parliamentary government is characterized by pronounced party
discipline (much stronger than in the non-parliamentary American
system), supremacy of the legislative judgment, and a fusion of
executive and legislative powers. The advent of the Charter has
stimulated consciousness of individual rights, augmented the role of
judicial review, and, by transferring from the legislature to the
judiciary issues concerning the appropriate balance between
individual and communal welfare, contributed to the politicization of
legal culture in Canada.8 Canadian federalism is a complex and
highly organic mosaic responding simultaneously to a host of
concerns: the accommodation of French and English, the balancing
of regional and national interests, the reconciliation of the
contradictions inherent in parliamentary government and the Charter,
the desire for efficient and democratically responsive governments,
and the manner in which regional concerns are manifested in the
central government.
Canadian federalism began as a vision of a strong central
government with only certain limited and enumerated powers ceded
to the provinces. 9 Within a short period of time, the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council began to interpret this federal
scheme in a fashion that virtually reversed the initial presumption
that the central government possessed all residual power remaining

7 Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter]. It is, of course, true that from the beginning of
confederation the power of judicial review was exercised by the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council and later by the Supreme Court of Canada. This power, while focused upon
the allocation of power between the central government and the provincial government under
the Constitution Act 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, also served to limit the ability of
governments to invade fundamental human rights. See Reference Re Alberta Statutes, [1938]
2 S.C.R. 100.
8 See M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).
9 See John A Macdonald's statements on the virtues of a strong federal government at
the 1864 Quebec Conference in Sir Joseph Pope, ed., Confederation: Being a Series of Hitherto
UnpublishedDocuments Bearing on the British North America Act (Toronto: Carswell, 1895)
at 54-55. See also Macdonald's remarks in the Canadian legislature in ParliamenayDebates
on the Subject of Confederation of the British North American Provinces: 3d Session, 8th
ProvincialParliamentof Canada (Quebec- Hunter Ross, 1865) at 33.
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after the limited cession of authority to the provinces 1 ° Moreover,
it may well be that, as Simeon and Robinson contend, the "federal
form" of Canada has always followed the "state function.""1 Thus,
Canadian federalism has as often concerned the relative primacy of
national and provincial communities as it has the conflicting claims
of various ethnic communities. In the mediation of these disputes,
Canadian federalism acquired a heavy flavouring of executive
federalism - accommodation by and between intergovernmental
elites - that in the wake of Meech Lake is undergoing more
sustained attack than perhaps at any other previous time.
All of these aspects of Canadian constitutionalism are, in
greater or lesser measure, currently in flux. The failure of the
Meech Lake Accord was partly a failure of process. The Accord
was conceived in the womb of executive federalism, but its stillborn
delivery has resulted in considerable misgivings about the efficacy of
executive federalism in the process of constitutional amendment.
The Meech Lake Accord was also partly a failure of substance,
revealing that Canada was simultaneously riven with doubts about an
increasingly decentralized future and concerned that the Accord
failed adequately to recognize the multiplicity of Canadian culture.
Clyde Wells spoke for the centre and Elijah Harper spoke for the
ignored periphery; their point of union was opposition to Meech
Lake.
The plasticity of the current constitutional situation is further
enhanced by social, cultural, demographic, and political changes that
are undeniable. Forty per cent of Canadians are neither of British
nor French ancestry. Canadian cities, where over three-fourths of
the population resides,1 2 are increasingly multicultural. The rest of
Canada resides in an "old style" pattern of monoethnicity. With the
10 See C.R. Massey, "The Locus of Sovereignty: Judicial Review, Legislative Supremacy,
and Federalism in the Constitutional Traditions of Canada and the United States" (1990)
Duke LJ. 1229. But see G.P. Browne, The Judicial Committee and the British North America
Act: An Anaysis of the InterpretativeScheme for the Distribution ofLegislativePower (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1967).
11 R. Simeon & I. Robinson, State Society, and the Development of CanadianFederalism
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) at 339.
12 The Canadian World Almanac & Book of Facts, 1989 (Toronto: Global Press, 1988)
at 338.
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advent of the Free Trade Agreement (and the possibility of a North
American customs union encompassing Mexico as well), trade is
increasingly in a north-south vector. When tariff barriers are fully
eliminated, economic logic will displace national passion, for it makes
economic sense for goods and services to travel the shorter route
north and south than for their equivalents to move from Ontario to
British Columbia. The inevitable result is the increasing economic
separation of each part of Canada from its fellow partners in
confederation. Canada's national debt, amassed in part to provide
for national social services, now imposes a severe fiscal restraint
which promises to cripple the federal government's role in the
future delivery of such services. Thirty six cents from every dollar
of federal tax revenue now goes to service the national debt. With
that inexorable fiscal demand comes shrinking opportunity for the
federal government to make any real commitment to national social
services.
At the same time, constitutional patriation has altered the
political fabric in ways still being noticed. The Charter has brought
a greater commitment, on the part of both citizens and political
institutions, to the individual and collective rights it guarantees.
However, because the Charter is judicially enforceable, there has
been a perceptible shift of focus and authority toward the judiciary
and away from the legislative branch of government.
This
marginalization of the legislative process may be partly responsible
for a larger shift of attitude toward institutions, for there seems to
be more open questioning of the legitimacy of executive federalism,
party discipline, and, of course, the Senate. It may be that, through
a process only dimly perceived as yet, patriation of the Constitution
has fulfilled Peter Leslie's warning delivered before the Meech Lake
process began: "The constitution is a genie in a corked bottle.
Before uncorking it, one must be sure the genie will13not grow to
unpredictable proportions, or become unmanageable."
Thus, it appears that there exist some significant structural
forces pushing the Canadian federal system toward greater
decentralization. Before proposing tangible alterations, however, it

13 P.Leslie, Rebuildingthe Relationship: Quebec and Its ConfederationParner (Kingston,
Ont.: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, 1987) at 33.
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would be prudent to develop the theoretical case for decentralized
federalism. Only by understanding what a decentralized federal
union can - and cannot - accomplish will we have any sound basis

for proposing change to the centre of that union.
II. THE FEDERALIST IDEAL AND HUMAN AUTONOMY
The federalist ideal - a central government responsible for
issues of common national concern and regional governments
responsible for the issues which touch the daily fabric of the
people's lives - brims with new promise in today's world. Never in
recent history have so many governments been pressured by so many
people for the right to govern themselves in smaller units. The
Soviet Union's constituent republics, including Russia, have begun to
declare themselves legally autonomous. Quebec, of course, threatens
to sever most, if not all, its political ties with the remainder of
Canada. Yugoslavia is racked by conflict between its constituent
ethnic groups and appears to be on the verge of collapse as a
unified state.
While many of these examples are tinged with assertions of
ethnic identity, there is another thread which runs through the
modem renascence of the federalist ideal. People want greater
control over their own lives. They are discovering that such a
simple desire is not easily obtainable from a central government
asserting political power over vast territories or multiple ethnic
groups, each with differing conceptions of the "good life." The
result is the contemporary clamor for local or regional autonomy,
whether in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, or Quebec.
It is not surprising that these demands should be made, for
there exist compelling reasons to think that decentralized regimes of
government better serve the cause of human liberty. To understand
the case for the federalist ideal as the optimal agent by which
human liberty can be realized, it is first necessary that we agree
upon the attributes of human liberty.
Liberty is not exclusively a lack of governmental interference.
Kuwait's lack of sufficient armed forces to deter or repel Iraqi
invasion surely did not operate to increase the level of human
liberty enjoyed by Kuwaitis. Nor would people suffering from
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cancer as a result of unregulated dumping of toxic wastes in
municipal water supplies think that governmental abstention was of
net benefit to their liberties. One aspect of human liberty is the
right to participate in a democratic decision-making process: the
right to make decisions about how the society should organize itself
in order to deliver results thought to be congenial to a majority of
its members.
This is surely an inadequate description of human liberty,
however, for some matters are thought to be so fundamental to
individual dignity that they must be taken completely out of the
majoritarian process. These issues, whether they consist of freedom
of speech or conscience, the presumption of innocence, or freedom
from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, are treated as matters with
respect to which democracy itself cannot be trusted. The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, of course, stands as the principal
exposition of this desire to insulate fundamental rights from the
vagaries of the legislative majority. In theory, the federalist ideal
has little to say about these matters, for federalism is primarily a
device for the allocation of democratic decision-making power
among government units. Fundamental human rights are regarded
as properly exempt from that power, wherever exercised, because
they are so important to human welfare that they transcend
authority derived from the act of political union. Since these rights
are theoretically incapable of invasion by any government, it is
necessary to prevent local or regional governments, as well as
national governments, from encroaching upon these fundamental
rights.
The Charterdoes not, of course, adhere to such a doctrinaire
approach; by the "notwithstanding clause," both Parliament and the
provincial legislatures are permitted to override a major portion of
the guaranteed individual rights. The Charter restricted the
permissible scope of provincial action, but through the
notwithstanding clause it preserved some measure of the former
authority possessed by the provinces. Thus, while theory might
suggest that fundamental human rights are altogether outside the
ken of federalism, in fact, the Canadian federal order preserves a
considerable degree of regional choice in deciding precisely which
human rights are so fundamental that they may not be infringed by
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legislative majorities. This power is controversial and its exercise is
politically risky, but it exists as a part of the federal terrain.
Related to the fundamental rights conception of human
liberty is the notion that there remains, even within the sphere of
legitimate democratic action, a core aspirational principle which
should operate to temper the action of the democratic polity. That
principle is simply to retain the most freedom of individual choice
compatible with the legitimate needs of the community. Unlike
fundamental rights, these rights lack a societal consensus that the
particular right in question is so important that it transcends the
power of governments. In short, the difference is that between the
right to drive an automobile and the right to be free of
governmental discrimination on the basis of race. Thus, the portion
of human liberty which inheres in the democratic process carries
with it a tempering and tension producing corollary principle, the
ideal of preservation of individual choice.
The claim that decentralized regimes better serve the cause
of human liberty requires a demonstration of the manner in which
these aspects of human liberty are advanced by the federalist ideal.
I will attempt to do so by first describing the benefits of
decentralization in connection with the liberties afforded by a
democratic process; then, by developing the contention that local
governmental units can aid the preservation of fundamental, and
politically transcendent, human liberties; and briefly by surveying
some of the contemporary applications of these themes.
A. Decentralizationand the Democratic PoliticalProcess
There are three major ways in which autonomous smaller
units of government can improve the liberty inherent in a
democratic political process. They are better able to effectuate the
interests and welfare preferences of the people. Their existence is
indispensable to protection of optimal individual choice within the
legitimate zone of authority of the democratic political process.
Finally, they are calculated to preserve the spirit of democracy: the
ideal that democratic governments do not operate upon people in
an exogenous fashion, but are more akin to a cooperative
association which claims the fealty of its members on the basis of
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mutual obligation and benefit. A detailed examination is necessary
to substantiate these claims.
1. The interests and welfare preferences of the people
This argument is founded on three assumptions about human
behavior within a large scale political system.
First, social
preferences will vary from region to region, reflecting cultural
diversity born of ethnicity, isolation, historical accident, or some
combination of other factors. The second is more equivocal, for it
cuts both for and against the federalist ideal of decentralization. It
is essentially the economic problem of externalities transferred to
the political realm: people, through their representatives, will seek
to obtain benefits, the cost of which will be borne by other people
outside the benefited jurisdiction. This phenomenon requires an
optimal political unit, large enough to prevent small political units
from capturing benefits at the expense of their neighbors, but small
enough to prevent factional alliances from plundering one part of
the polity for the benefit of another. The third assumption relates
to the first: smaller units of government will compete among
themselves to attract desirable inhabitants and create desirable
conditions of life. The innovations, thus spurred, benefit the aspect
of human liberty seeking to foster optimal individual choice with
respect to one's short course through life.
a) Regional preferences
If preferences do differ between regions, a straightforward,
utilitarian calculation easily demonstrates the value of decentralized
units of government. Assume a national polity of 200 people, of
which 105 prefer mandatory seat-belt laws and the remaining 95 are
opposed. Majority rule on this issue will please 105 people and
displease 95. But suppose that in Region One, 75 people favor
mandatory seat-belt laws and 25 are opposed; while, in Region Two,
only 35 people favor such laws and the remaining 65 people are
opposed. If the two regions are permitted to act autonomously,
Region One will adopt a mandatory seat-belt law and Region Two
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will not. Now, 140 people will be pleased with the outcome of the
political process, only 60 people will be disappointed. Absent an
extraordinary judgment of the polity that freedom from mandatory
seat-belt laws is so fundamental as to transcend the democratic
process, or the presence of externally imposed costs associated with
the policies independently adopted by these hypothetical regions, the
utility-maximizing outcome described seems clearly desirable.
b) The problem of externalities

4

Unfortunately, the possibility, indeed the probability, of
externalities cannot be overlooked. Small units of government will
be tempted to adopt policies that produce benefits for their
constituents paid for by residents of other jurisdictions. Similarly,
large scale units of government will be susceptible to factional
alliances arranged to capture the machinery of government in order
to deliver benefits to the faction's members, the costs of which will
be borne by citizens not affiliated with the dominant faction.
Moreover, small units of government will not incur some costs, like
national defence, because their benefit is sufficiently dissipated over
the entire polity that it makes little economic sense for a single
jurisdiction to incur all of the costs of provision of a benefit which
will be freely enjoyed by others. Thus, there is clearly reason to
tinker with the jurisdictional authority of political units, making the
boundaries of such authority congruent with the full costs and
benefits of the decisions made by the political unit. Dissonance
results in externalities, and politicians shrewdly exploit these
opportunities to capture "free" benefits by imposing their costs on
others. It is a form of political arbitrage which, unlike economic
arbitrage, serves less to achieve market equilibrium than to distort
and pervert both allocations of public resources and the democratic
process itself.
For example, assume a local municipality consisting of one
hundred renters, fifty resident landlords and fifty non-resident
landlords. Assuming the municipality perceives benefits to be
14 This problem is discussed extensively in R.A. Posner, Economic Anaysis of Law, 3d

ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1986) at 600.
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derived from rent control, it is likely to impose rent controls
ostensibly benefitting the in-place renters to the detriment of a
minority of resident landlords and a group of unrepresented nonresident landlords. However, the external costs of the regulation do
not stop there. Presuming that rent control was motivated by rising
rents, the product of excess demand for residential accommodation
in the municipality, the institution of rent controls will induce
renters to remain in place, thus directing their would-be
replacements (able and willing to outbid the in-place renters for
scarce accommodations) to adjacent communities, where rents will be
bid up to the detriment of in-place renters in those communities
(and, of course, to the benefit of landlords in those adjacent
communities). In this instance, the unit of decision is too small.
The decision to impose rent controls is reached by a polity which
will not bear the full costs or benefits associated with that decision.
The problem is not confined to small units of government.
A national government is no less susceptible to political "rentseeking." National regulations often operate to dispense favors to
one region at the expense of another. In the United States,
environmental laws which permit midwestern utilities to burn
relatively cheap coal which produces acid rain in the northeast (and,
of course, Canada) deliver benefits to Appalachian coal miners and
midwestern utility customers at the expense of northeastern and
Canadian users of surface water. The point becomes even sharper
when one turns from regulation to spending. From the standpoint
of provinces and local communities, the national treasury has all the
attributes of a common pool resource, like a fishery. If local
projects, like San Francisco's cable car system, can be built with
federal funds, all municipalities will scramble to appropriate as much
of the common pool as possible. Never mind that these local
projects might not be undertaken if local residents were required to
pay for them, since, from the local perspective, they are virtually
free.15 Thus, just like the Atlantic cod fishery and, in all likelihood,
15This point has been made convincingly by . Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus
of Consent- Logical Foundation of Constitutional Democracy (Michigan: University of

Michigan Press, 1962) at 133-40. See, generally, G. Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons"
in G. Hardin & . Baden, eds, Managing the Commons (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman,
1977) 16.
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the North Pacific salmon fishery, rapacious depletion of the common
pool inevitably exhausts the resource. Empty nets are the symptom
of exhaustion of the common fishery pool; pervasive, gigantic, and
unsustainable budget deficits are the symptom of exhaustion of the
common national treasury pool. Since the costs of exhaustion of the
resource will ultimately be borne by the entire polity, residents of
each locality would be better off if they could agree in advance to
confine" the authority of the national government to matters of
indubitably national consequence. It is an irony of American
constitutional history that, at the moment of constitutional union,
Americans thought they did just that, while after two centuries of
constitutional interpretation, Americans have discovered that the
national taxing and spending powers have been converted into a
common pool open to over-exploitation by all.
The federalist ideal offers no simple resolution of the
externality problem. The most that can be safely said is that the
problem requires us to assess carefully the jurisdictional authority of
the governments composing the federal ideal, with a view toward
achieving the optimal congruence of authority, that is, with the full
impact of the benefits and burdens flowing from decisions rendered
within that authority. The externality problem suggests strongly that
neither a unitary government nor a loose confederation with no
central authority is appropriate. Rather, the optimal structure is a
mixed system, combining a central government with plenary authority
over..-issues which deliver benefits and burdens nationally and
regional units sized and empowered to deliver benefits and burdens
which fall with regional impact.
c) Regional innovation and competition
A unitary national government is a political monopoly, while
the federalist ideal is, if not perfectly competitive, at least an
arrangement that permits units of government both to experiment
with different approaches to common problems and to craft unique
solutions to unique problems of the local polity. If, as I have
suggested, regions of the whole have differing preferences, it is likely
that such regional units of government will innovate to deliver
outcomes most suitable to their constituents. Moreover, the very act
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of decentralization creates an incentive to the regional units of
government to adopt those policies most widely preferred. If
political choices influence economic vigour, which operates to
produce sufficient public income to reduce the pro rata cost of
government, individual fortunes within a polity will be enhanced by
political choices which encourage economic activity. This, in turn,
may attract new taxpayers to the locality, thus spreading the fixed
costs of government over a larger pool. By each of these
phenomena, the per capita cost of government may decrease.
There is, of course, no reason why a regional polity need opt
for policies which foster economic growth. A region may prefer
policies inimical to growth, adopted in order to foster the perceived
benefits of stasis. The benefit to human liberty is that people have
a choice of regime, unlike the unitary national government which
operates to deprive them of any such choice.
There are surely some costs associated with regional
innovation and competition, but upon examination they may be seen
as yet another example of the familiar problem of externalities. To
use an American example, state statutes designed to shield
corporations from unwanted takeovers may be simply attempts to
capture the local benefits of employment or corporate charity, while
imposing the costs of such benefits on shareholders or consumers
residing elsewhere. Similarly, the American practice of permitting
individual states to control their tort law, without the possibility of
review by the United States Supreme Court, may have resulted in
rules designed to capture financial benefits for injured in-state
plaintiffs. These benefits would, however, be at the expense of outof-state corporate defendants (whether product manufacturers or
liability insurers), their largely out-of-state shareholders (in the form
of lower returns), and out-of-state customers of the corporate
defendants (in the form of higher product costs). To the extent
these externalities appear, it is a signal of a flaw in the jurisdictional
allocation. Accordingly, devices ought to be built into the federalist
ideal to permit correction of such failings when, and if, they are
detected.
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2. Smaller units of government are better protectors
of individual liberty of choice
This contention is quite counter-intuitive to Americans who
came of political age when American states engaged in official racial
discrimination, tolerated "private" acts of violent assault and murder
upon African-Americans, and indulged generally in a myriad of
repressive measures inimical to human liberty. It would probably
also be counter-intuitive to persons like Pierre Trudeau, who came
of age in the repressive atmosphere of Maurice Duplessis's Union
Nationale government of Quebec. These experiences suggest that
James Madison was correct when he argued that the chief danger
to individual liberty was factional, majoritarian tyranny and that small
units of government posed the greatest opportunity for the tyrants
of faction to seize control 6 Madison, however, overlooked the
danger of factional control of the national legislative process.
Indeed, one of the central lessons of our time is that Parliament or
Congress, like a provincial or state legislature, may be captured by
skillful, influential, interest groups seeking to serve their narrow
ends. While it is important not to minimize the dangers of factional
abuse of fundamental human liberties within regional governments,
it is equally important to remember that such abuse may be visited
as well upon the nation as a whole.
Given the possibility of national factional tyranny, there are
at least three reasons why small units of government preserve a
greater measure of individual liberty of choice than would a
consolidated, unitary scheme of government.
a) Mobility and choice
A unitary central government necessarily operates to establish
legal rules of uniform applicability throughout the nation. If these
rules are harsh and oppressive, there is little opportunity for escape.
International migration is, of course, a possibility, but the hurdles

16 .Madison, "Number X" in M. Beloff, ed., The Federalist (New York. Basil Blackwell,

1987) 41.
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which must be overcome are of considerable magnitude. For most
people, international mobility is more theoretical than actual. In a
society formed on the principle of the federalist ideal, harsh and
oppressive measures adopted by one region can be more easily
evaded by movement to a more congenial region. Thus, for
example, for a good portion of the twentieth century AfricanAmericans emigrated from the states of the old Confederacy to
other parts of the United States in search of better economic
opportunities and freedom from the repression of Jim Crow regimes.
More recently, American homosexuals have flocked to New York,
San Francisco, Washington, and other metropolitan areas where
official and unofficial toleration of diverse sexual habits is
considerably more pronounced than in, say, rural Arkansas.
Moreover, there are wide variations in that which is regarded
as harsh and oppressive. Municipalities like Berkeley and Santa
Monica, California have adopted socialist regimes, centering on
extreme forms of rent control, that are presumably regarded as
beneficial to a majority of their residents. Putting aside the
troublesome question of the externalities associated with such
regimes, residents who regard Berkeley socialism as distasteful are
free to remove themselves or their capital from the jurisdiction. A
majority of Massachusetts residents may regard high levels of
taxation as a boon; those who do not are free to leave. Indeed,
part of the economic growth experienced by southern New
Hampshire has resulted from the arrival of former Massachusetts
residents seeking a lower rate of taxation.
Removal is not, however, always an easy or pleasant matter.
People have a web of relationships, including jobs, families, schools,
and personal associations with place, making movement difficult.
Accordingly, we cannot expect mobility to be the answer to every
oppressive scheme concocted by local or regional governments. It
is important to remember that fundamental human rights ought to
transcend the legitimate powers of any government, regional or
central. If governments do not transgress the fundamental norms,
however, regional autonomy will produce considerably more
opportunity for individual choice than permitted in a centralized
regime.
Perhaps one of the surest indicators that regional autonomy
operates to preserve choice is the hostility exhibited to this idea by
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the academic champions of utopian "communitarian" regimes.
Professor Linda Hirshman, for example, in the course of extolling
the communitarian ideal as an organizing principle for the United
States, declares her preference for accomplishing this ideal through
the central government because "the goal ...
will be weakened1 7 if
in the polity."
location
another
to
moving
by
escape
can
citizens
b) Controllinggovernmentalpower exerted to further the interest
of the governors rather than the governed
Politicians are prone to at least two forms of political
exploitation. I have discussed previously the tendency of politicians
to exploit one segment of society for the benefit of other segments.
Politicians also tend toward profoundly self-interested behavior;
without some checking device, they will begin to appropriate the
apparatus of government for their personal self-interested ends.
This problem, recognized by Madison in the fifty-first Federalist
Paper, is more easily controlled by a government with strong popular
controls. Madison assumed that those controls would be stronger in
smaller units of government.1
Two centuries later, American
constitutional scholars continue to agree with Madison on this
19
point.
If state or provincial officials can pervert their offices to
serve their individual ends, it may be that American states or
Canadian provinces are simply too large a unit of government.
There is nothing inherently correct about American states or
Canadian provinces as the optimal unit size of government. Indeed,
depending on the issue in question, it may be appropriate to deliver
authority to very small regions (for example, watersheds) or to
17 LR. Hirshman, "The Virtue of Liberality in American Communal Life" (1990) 88
Mich. L Rev. 983 at 1027 (citations omitted).
18 R. Rutland, ed., The Papers of James Madison, vol. 10 (Chicago: University of
Chicago, 1977) at 214 (Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 24 October 1787).
19 See A. Rapaczynski, "From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism
After Garcia" (1985) Sup. Ct Rev. 341 at 389; M.W. McConnell, "Contract Rights and
Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and
Constitutional Structure" (1988) 76 Calif. L Rev. 267.
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municipalities. Even if provinces remain the principal unit of
decentralized government, it is still relatively more likely that the
self-aggrandizing provincial official will be scrutinized by the people
than the self-aggrandizing national official.
c) Diverse centres of power act as mutual checking devices
In defending the American federal republic proposed by the
1787 Convention, Madison contended that "a double security arises
to the rights of the people" because "the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then
the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments." 20 The result is that "[t]he different governments will
control each other; at the same time that each will be controlled by
itself."2' For Madison's contention to hold, it is necessary both that
the regional governments possess sufficient independent authority to
adopt policies which may not be overridden by the national
government and that the national government have a separate zone
of authority in which its judgment is supreme. We have seen that
recognition and control of externalities is one useful device which
may be employed to survey the boundary between these two fields.
It is essential, however, that the boundary be maintained.
One of the major failings of contemporary American
constitutional law is its inability to devise a mechanism that
preserves a boundary line, accomplishing the Madisonian aspiration.
The national legislative power to regulate commerce has become a
bloated caricature of its original self, having been transformed into
a grant of virtually plenary authority to regulate any aspect of life
which has the slimmest of plausible connections to commerce
"among the several States."2 2 Whenever Congress chooses to
exercise that power with sufficient broadness of application, it

20 1 Madison, 'Number LP in The Federalist,supra, note 16 at 266.

21 Ibid.
22 U.S. CONST., art. I, s. 8, cl. 3.
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displaces any contrary state legislation or constitutional norms.2 As
a result, the states' freedom to adopt policies independent of the
national government exists as an act of congressional grace.
Consequently, the states no longer perform the role envisioned by
Madison- checking the power of the national government - but are
reduced to mere courtiers and supplicants in the palace of national
government.
This condition is, of course, defended by those who argue
that the national political process itself - a Congress consisting
entirely of state representatives - is a sufficient check
The
problem with this argument is that it presumes that legislators in the
national government retain their character as regional representatives, when, in fact, their employer in more than name is the
national government. It is asking a bit much of the lions to exercise
voluntary restraint in eating the Christian; what is needed is a strong
fence to separate the two.
When that dividing line is properly maintained, regional
governments will act in a fashion which checks the central
government. To take but one contemporary example: a number of
American states have begun to offer public school students a wide
range of choice with respect to the school they attend. These plans
have generated controversy and attracted a great deal of opposition
from portions of the polity who perceive them as a threat to their
interests. If, in pursuit of its commerce power, Congress were to
prescribe a national "curriculum and mandate a single national rule
by which students were to be assigned to a public school, there
would be no possibility of a regional check on what may very well
be an utterly misguided policy. It is this sort of check - one closely
related to .the preservation of individual choice by reason of
See LH. Tribe, American ConstiutonalLaw, 2d ed. (New York. Foundation Press,
1988) at 479-81.
24 See J.H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National PoliticalProcess: A Functional
Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1980) and H. Wechsler, "The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in

the Composition and Selection of the National Government" (1954) 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543.
This view has now become constitutional orthodoxy. See Garciav. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 at 551 (1985): state sovereignty is "more properly protected by
procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created
limitations on federal power."
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governmental innovation and personal mobility - which must be
preserved if the cause of human liberty is to be advanced.
In contrast to the United States, Canada has maintained far
more vigorously the line between federal and provincial authority.
Parliament's power to exercise virtually plenary authority over any
aspect of national life is far more circumscribed. The problem in
Canada is not the centripetal force of Ottawa, but rather managing
the political centrifuge by keeping the regions in the federal orbit.
The late Senator Eugene Forsey brilliantly captured the Canadian
problem when he ridiculed decentralization as having the potential
to turn the national anthem into a refrain 25of "0, Canada, beloved
referee, of customs dues, and fiscal policy."
3. Smaller units of government are more likely to preserve
the spirit of democracy
The democratic ideal is of a polity that works together,
fashioning a communal destiny. The government which results is not
a remote and foreign enterprise, but the expression of an interested
and involved citizenry. In this ideal, governments claim the fealty of
the governed, not by fear of force, but on the basis of mutual
obligation and benefit. Smaller units of government are better
suited to the preservation of these ideals for three related reasons.
a) Voluntary compliance with the obligations of law
As the size of the unit of government decreases, the
incidence of voluntary compliance with law will increase. As
governing communities become smaller, there is a sense of greater
participation in the process by which legal norms are established,
resulting in less political alienation. As well, when the unit of
government is small enough, the social opprobrium attached to
revealed non-compliance will be higher. In a small community, it is
much more difficult to evade detection as a norm-breaker. The risk

25 Quoted in A. Wilson-Smith, "Humor and Eloquence" Maclean's (4 March 1991) 18.
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of social stigmatization, and its cost to the law-breaker, is higher
than in larger communities.
By contrast, in large communities, the optimal strategy of
each individual is to violate the law while all others observe it.
When every person follows this course of conduct, all citizens are
worse off. The truth of this contention can be observed daily in any
large metropolitan area, as drivers speed through traffic lights
winking from yellow to red, in the hopes that other citizens are not
emulating them. Occasionally, another driver, anticipating a green
traffic signal, will collide with the first driver, thus proving to them
both that pursuit of an individual strategy when confronted with the
"prisoner's dilemma" minimizes utility outcomes.
The social
pressures of the small community, and the sense of belonging it
engenders, provide powerful incentives for a strategy of cooperation
which overcomes
the utility costs resulting from individual
6
strategies.

2

Of course, these conditions may only be obtained fully in
very small communities. Yet, there is no reason to think that the
phenomena of political alienation and social detection and
stigmatization are sharply discontinuous at some magic moment of
governmental unit size. It is far more likely that the structural
stimuli to a cooperative, rather than individual, strategy towards
observance of law decrease in some rough proportion to the
increasing size of the governmental unit.
b) Voluntary compliance with the duties of representation
Voluntary compliance with law by the governed is but one
half of the equation. As governmental unit size decreases, the
voluntary sense of duty toward the governed will be felt more
strongly by their representatives. When communication between the
governed and the governors occurs primarily through the glass eyes
of television camera and screen, it is absurd to pretend that the

26 For a general discussion of the "prisoner's dilemma" problem, see M. Olson, Jr., The
Logic of Collective Action" Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, 2d ed. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1971) at 9-16 and R. Clark, CorporateLaw (Boston: Little, Brown,
1986) at 392-93.
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representatives are "well informed as to the circumstances of the
27
people, ... [able] to sympathize ... [or] communicate with them."

Moreover, national legislators are necessarily required to remove
themselves geographically to the nation's capital. The removal
destroys the natural attachment representatives might otherwise feel
for the lives of their constituents, for they no longer experience life
in Alberta, but rather, a vastly different life in Ottawa. Representatives begin to substitute their preferences, formed in part by their
experiences of the national capital, for those of their constituents.
Moreover, even if they sincerely desire to do otherwise, the removal
(culturally, geographically, and structurally, through such insulating
devices as political staff) poses considerable problems of information
transmission from the governed to the governor.28
These structural problems are less evident as the size of the
relevant governmental unit shrinks. Once again, there is no reason
to suppose that there is some threshold marking the line between
governments possessing these flaws and those happily free of them.
The structural problems are likely to diminish as the unit size of
government decreases.
c) Civic virtue and small communities
The ideal of a community in which political actors are
motivated primarily to accomplish that which is best for the entire
individual goals, is an ideal which
community, rather than
permeated the thought of the American founding generation29 and
persists to the present.30 There are, however, significant differences

27 HJ. Storing, ed., The CompleteAnti-Federalist,vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1981) para. 2.8.99 (Letter from a Federal Farmer).
28 The greater the removal of representatives from constituents, "the more noise is
introduced into the process by the individual bureaucrats who have their own preference
functions and by the problems of information transmission." See G. Tullock, "Federalism:
Problems of Scale" (1969) 6 Public Choice 19 at 25.
29 See G.S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Williamsburg,

Virginia: University of North Carolina, 1969) at 68.
30

See F. Michelman, "Law's Republic" (1988) 97 Yale LJ. 1493; C.R. Sunstein, "Beyond

the Republican Revival" (1988) 97 Yale I.J. 1539 and BA. Ackerman, "The Storrs Lectures:
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between eighteenth and twentieth century visions of the civically
virtuous community. The modem version flirts with authoritarianism
as a device to compel a reluctant and persistently individualistic
polity to put the clerisy's vision of community welfare ahead of
diverse individual notions of welfareY The eighteenth century
version was one which relied upon the structural attributes of small
communities, rather than authoritarian edicts, to produce the
common good.
For individuals to act for the common welfare rather than in
pursuit of individual advantage, they must have a strongly felt stake
in the community. Their sense of that stake will increase if they
actively participate in the resolution of issues of public consequence.
The familiar, and now largely lost, town meeting is the paradigmatic
device, increasing every citizen's stake in the community by soliciting
extensive participation of ordinary citizens in policy formulation. In
a small community, voters have an incentive to monitor and vote for
candidates for elective office, because "small groups ... may very well
be able to provide themselves with a collective good because of the
attraction of the collective good to the individual members."32 By
contrast, once the community has become quite large, in theory, no
single member has sufficient motivation to monitor representatives
or vote for candidates for office because the significance of the
individual action declines dramatically with the size of the political
unit. The temptation to become a "free rider" becomes almost
rational. 33
Moreover, the sense of stake in the small community is not
one rooted entirely in the process of decision-making; it is also
created by a sense of kinship, the same emotions one feels for
Discovering the Constitution" (1984) 93 Yale L.J. 1013. For a more complete bibliography
of modem work on the theme of "civic republicanism," see Hirshman, supra, note 17.
31 "One might be willing ... to behave in an otherwise unacceptably authoritarian fashion
for some secure notion of the good ... an acceptable resolution of the competing claims of
[communal] virtue ... and individual autonomy may vary, and vary considerably." See
Hirshman, ibid. at 993, 996.
32 Olson, supra, note 26 at 36.
33 For a further discussion of rational apathy and its connection with over-exploitation
of common goods, see Olson, ibid. at 9-16, 21, 163-64 n. 102. For a discussion of rational
apathy among corporate shareholders, see Clark, supra, note 26 at 390-96.
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family. Just as a person can be expected to sacrifice individual
interests for the sake of loved ones, so may individuals feel some
less powerful version of that emotion with respect to the small
community, but almost none of it with respect to a national
community of virtual strangers. Civic virtue is thus born from
within, rather than artificially imposed from without. The germ is a
governmental structure that fosters this endogenous form of civic
virtue.
B. FundamentalRights and the FederalistIdeal
As previously noted, no government, whatever its size, has
legitimate authority to trench upon those human liberties which are
sufficiently fundamental to be, in theory, beyond governmental
control. However, in a society that defines such rights in a political
fashion, rather than accepting some ostensibly extrinsic definition
(such as divine inspiration), the federalist ideal may have some role
in the process of locating and preserving fundamental rights.
Fundamental rights are regarded as fundamental because a
consensus of the polity congeals around a particular right. Freedom
from human slavery is plainly fundamental, but in the United States
of 1850 no such political (as distinguished from a moral) conclusion
could have been made. The right to vote regardless of one's gender
is similarly fundamental, but was not so regarded in nineteenth
century America or Canada. The process by which rights become
fundamental - the formation of national consensus - is one which
furthers the cause of human liberty by the participation of the
regional units of the federalist ideal.
There are at least two ways in which regional preferences
can affect this process. First, fundamental rights can be identified
only by a process requiring assent by a super-majority of the
constituent regions. The United States Constitution mimics this form
in its requirement that congressionally proposed constitutional
amendments be ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures.3 4
The ConstitutionAct, 1982 does the same by its amending formulae,

34

U.S. CONST. art. V.
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requiring either unanimity of the provinces 5 or the assent of two36
thirds of the provinces comprising 50 per cent of the population.
Second, each region can be left free to determine for itself those
rights which are fundamental. This is the pattern followed by the
Charter, which permits any provincial legislature to override the
3 7 It is not intuitively
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.
obvious which solution is the more protective of fundamental human
rights.
To explore this vexing question, I propose to use the obvious
contemporary example. About half of the American polity regards
the right of a woman to terminate an unwanted pregnancy as
fundamental and beyond legitimate abrogation by the democratic
process. The other half regards this right as subject to abrogation,
totally or in part, depending on a variety of circumstances. The
initial response of the American system to this condition was, of
course, the constitutional judgment of Roe v. Wade38 that the right
was fundamental for the first trimester of pregnancy, but
progressively less so thereafter. That judgment is one which trumps
regional preferences and can be overridden only by a change of
heart (or personnel) of the United States Supreme Court or by a
coalition of regional preferences sufficiently strong to identify a
national consensus. Since no national consensus exists, it is
unsurprising that no such coalition has emerged. In Canada, by

Supra, note 3, s. 41.
36 Ibid. s. 38(l).
37
Supra, note 7, s. 33. Of course, the provision also vests a similar power in Canada's
Parliament. Only Quebec and Saskatchewan have exercised the provincial power. Quebec has
employed this provision as a tactical weapon in its ongoing linguistic, cultural, and political
struggle with the remainder of Canada. See An Act Respecting the Constitution Act, S.Q.
1982, c. 21 (repealing all Quebec legislation and immediately re-enacting the same with the
addition of a notwithstanding declaration in each statute). The validity of this action under
the Charter was upheld in Ford v. AG. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 54 D.LR. 577.
Saskatchewan used the power on one occasion to obtain leverage in a labour dispute with
public employees. See The SGEU Dispute Settlement Act, S.S. 1984-85-86, c. 111. See also
Mandel, supra, note 8 at 77 and R. Tasse, "Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" in G.A. Beaudoin & E. Ratushny, eds, The Charterof Rights and Freedoms, 2d ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1989) 65 at 107-8.
38 410 U.S. 113 (1978) [hereinafter Roe].
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contrast, a Roe-like decision under the Canadian Charter39 could be
freely overridden by a province. One's conclusion about the net
benefit to human liberty of these contrasting arrangements is apt to
depend on one's view of the underlying substantive issue. But if I
am correct in the contention that fundamental rights become so by
virtue of national coalescence around them, there can be little
principled opposition to the idea of regional autonomy with respect
to rights which have yet to achieve fundamental status. Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court's most recent position with respect to
the status of the abortion right is to permit states an increasing
amount of regulatory latitude,4° a position which bears certain rough
similarities to the Canadian provincial override power.41
Once a national consensus has been reached, should a single
region with a markedly different preference be able to make its
dissent stick? If it may not, what principle, apart from sheer force,
dictates that the dissenting region be required to continue in the
national orbit? If the United States agrees that the abortion right
is fundamental, but Louisiana is the sole dissenter, why is Louisiana
not entitled to secede and establish itself as an independent polity?
Americans have little difficulty applauding such unilateral regional
decisions when undertaken by Lithuanians, but would likely balk at
Louisiana's hypothesized secession. One way of avoiding the
extreme trauma of secession is the provision of mechanisms like

None exists. The closest Canadian parallel is R v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30,
44 D.LR. (4th) 385 [hereinafter Morgentalerl, which invalidated section 251 of Canada's
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, restricting abortions, as a violation of the Charter's
section 7 guarantee of "security of the person." See Charter, supra, note 7. Unlike Roe,
Morgentaler did not purport to define the circumstances in which abortions could not be

regulated. Thus, the opportunity was presented for further legislation on the subject, which
may or may not comport with the guarantees of section 7. The House of Commons enacted
a restrictive abortion law which was denied Senate approval and thus was not subjected to
judicial scrutiny under the Charter. See B. Wallace, "Back to Square 1: The Senate Rejects
New Abortion Legislation" Maclean's (11 February 1991) 15. The Supreme Court of Canada
has determined, however, that a fetus is not a person within the meaning of section 7. See
Daigle v. Tremblay, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530.
40 See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989); Ohio v. Akron
Centerfor Reproductive Health, 110 S. CL 29 (1990) and Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S.CL 2926
(1990).
41 For an elaboration upon this theme in a variety of constitutional contexts, see,
generally, Massey, supra, note 10.
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Canada's, which permit dissident regions to maintain their
independent sense of fundamental human liberties. Yet, to guard
against abuses, it is important to insist that an overwhelming
majority of the entire regional polity act affirmatively by an open
and honest plebiscite to manifest their dissenting intention.
Rights become fundamental through a political process and
not by divine proclamation. Thus, for reasons similar to those
applicable to the remainder of the democratic decision-making
process, a large measure of regional autonomy with respect to the
identification of fundamental rights is preferable. Stricter limits
upon such regional autonomy are appropriate, however, to protect
against the possibility of a region visiting harsh and invidious
treatment upon a powerless minority. Unfortunately, no limit will be
perfect. Some regional oppression will still be conceivable, but
squelching all possibility of regional oppression will be at the cost of
denying regions the opportunity to manifest reasonable dissenting
preferences.
C. Worldwide Devolution: "[T]he Centre Cannot Hold"42
The modem world is filled with actual and potential
applications of this theory. In general, both contemporary demands
for, or the existence of, decentralized regimes stem from decidedly
different regional preferences (particularly marked by linguistic,
cultural, or religious differences), pronounced problems of
externalities, or some combination of both.
1. Regional preferences based on linguistic, cultural,
or religious differences
Switzerland is foremost among the established and successful
decentralized regimes that have reached that condition because of
these regional variations. The Swiss federation of cantons leaves a
high degree of autonomy within each canton and, significantly,
42W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming" in M. Mack, L Dean & W. Frost, eds, Modem
Poetry, 2d ed. (Englewood, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1965) 75 at 75.
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makes no attempt to dictate a national consensus on matters of
religion or language. A resident of Zurich, for example, has no
right to insist upon French as the language of instruction for
schoolchildren. That is available in Geneva, and removal to Geneva
is the available solution. By contrast, Canada has embedded its
linguistic war within its constitution by a limited guarantee of French
as an instructional language in English Canada and of English as an
instructional language in Quebec.4 3 The result (though not for this
reason alone) in Canada is a seemingly endless friction over
language and cultural identity. For all its decentralization in other
respects, Canada is insufficiently decentralized on matters of
Recognizing linguistic hegemony within regions is
language.
probably a necessity to the maintenance of a multi-lingual federal
union.
Of course, there is always the possibility that linguistic and
cultural differences will prove so divisive as to make maintenance of
a multi-lingual federal union impossible. The imminent fission of
Yugoslavia into Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzevogina,
Macedonia, and Montenegro is an example of a blend of diverse
linguistic and cultural heritages simply too corrosive to endure. The
danger of official Canadian recognition of French linguistic
hegemony in Quebec and English hegemony almost everywhere else,
lies in the possibility that these two linguistically separate Canadas
will, like tectonic plates, drift farther and farther apart. When
tectonic plates drift, they produce destructive earthquakes and
volcanic eruptions. The product of linguistic and cultural drift is less
determinate, probably less dramatic, but possibly no less final.
Religious differences have proven to be considerably more
volatile and divisive. Thus, Israel's intractable problem with the
Intifada is partially the product of its unwillingness to provide an
autonomous region for Palestinians. Israeli decentralization alone
would not cure the many ailments of the Middle East, but would at
least have a salutary effect on the most immediate Israeli domestic
problem: persistent violent and nonviolent refusal to abide by the
commands of the central Israeli government. Whether decentralization could even begin to ameliorate the religious and cultural

43 See section 23 of the Charter,supra, note 7.
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schisms of Northern Ireland is far more problematic. I do not
propose the federalist ideal as a panacea for every affliction.
2. Demands for regional autonomy based on perceptions
of externalities imposed by the central government
When regions believe that they are being plundered for the
benefit of other regions, they react by demands for absolute or total
autonomy. Often these perceptions are combined with dramatic
differences in regional preferences resulting from cultural or
linguistic difference. The assertions of autonomy from the central
Soviet government by the federated republics of Russia, the
Ukraine, and the Baltic republics are all variants upon this strain.
The Baltic republics are probably driven more by cultural and
linguistic difference than a deep belief that the central Soviet
government has imposed burdens upon them for the benefit of other
regions of the Soviet Union. However, the appropriation of
national identity for the benefit of the central Soviet government is
itself an extreme form of psychic external cost. On the other hand,
the Russian and Ukrainian republics probably have good reason to
believe that their manufacturing and agricultural productivity has
been drained away in support of Soviet Central Asia, Eastern
Europe, or other client states of the central Soviet regime.
The phenomenon is certainly not limited to the communist
world. Staten Island's desire to secede from New York City reflects
its beiief that its economic base, relatively healthier than that of
Brooklyn or the Bronx, will be tapped by a New York City Board
of Estimate, which is controlled by those more populous boroughs,
for the frank benefit of the Bronx and Brooklyn. No doubt there
is also a measure of cultural disharmony added to the brew.
Western Canada has long felt itself isolated and excluded
from the Canadian centre,44 but with Quebec's demands for more
autonomy, Western Canada has begun to press even more vigorously
for its own autonomy. Part of the reason is the perception that
Western Canada, with its abundant forest, energy, and agricultural

44 See Kilgour, supra, note 6.
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assets, has been used by the central government to redistribute
wealth to poorer regions, particularly Atlantic Canada. With respect
to Canadian energy policy, it is arguable that Alberta has been
forced to forego economic benefits of its petroleum stocks in favour
of energy consumers throughout Canada, but particularly in
populous Ontario and Quebec. It is for these reasons, and perhaps
a bit of cultural difference with respect to Ontario (and major
linguistic differences with Quebec), that Western Canada's Reform
Party has begun to advocate ever more vigorously an Americanstyle national senate endowed with real legislative power, composed
of equal numbers of provincially elected members. In addition,
Western Canada's premiers have floated the notion that the western
provinces should establish their own regional income tax with
countervailing tax concessions on the part of the central government.45 Sentiment like this is hardly surprising, for sixty-four per
cent of all Canadians (much less westerners) feel that their province
gets back less in federal spending than they send to Ottawa in the
form of federally imposed taxes.4 6 It is possibly by virtue of these
perceptions that a bare majority of Canadians now declare that they
think of themselves as citizens of their province first and only
secondarily as Canadian.47
If there is a theoretical case for decentralized federalism, and
there are worldwide examples of the demands for its implementation, perhaps some of this theory can be usefully incorporated as
part of a solution to the seemingly intractable constitutional wars of
Canada.

45 M. Cernetig, "West Wants to Curb Ottawa's Spending" The [Toronto] Globe and
Mail (28 July 1990) Al at A2.
46 G. Fraser, "'Ties That No Longer Bind"' The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (4 August
1990) D1.
47 Ibid.
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II. PRESERVING CONFEDERATION:
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
Sometime in the spring of 1990, with less than three months
to go before the June 23 ratification deadline, Senator Gerald
Beaudoin is said to have whispered to a colleague while listening to
Clyde Wells, "C'est la fin du tout. C'est la fin du pays."48 Meech
Lake may well have ended the Canada that was, but there will
continue to be a Canada; it is simply the nature of that Canada that
remains to be seen. The principal alternative is, of course, either a
Canada without Quebec or a Canada including Quebec in some
revised form of federal union. Within each of these alternatives,
there exist additional possibilities. Canada without Quebec may
attempt to preserve the existing structural arrangements of Canadian
federalism, assume an even more centralized form of federal union
or, at the opposite extreme, devolve enormous powers upon regional
blocs or individual provinces. Canada including Quebec must, isa
practical matter, reallocate powers from the centre to the provinces
in order to keep Quebec within confederation. 49 The nature of the
reallocation is as variable as the human political imagination, but
one threshold issue to be decided within this branch of the inquiry
is the question of whether such reallocation would be equal with
respect to all provinces or only with respect to Quebec.
In this section, I propose a form of devolution which is
reasonably consistent with the theoretical justifications for a
decentralized federal union advanced in section II and, hopefully,
acceptable to enough of the nation to form a continued basis for
confederation.
I will also examine the levels of devolution
appropriate in the event that all efforts at preserving confederation
fail and Quebec departs.

48 Cohen, supra, note 3 at 227.
49 Of course, this assumes that force would never be used to keep Quebec within

confederation. Americans, steeped in the historical lore of the American Civil War, would
no doubt consider the alternative of force. It is one of the many things that make Canadians
different from Americans that Canadians would, in overwhelming numbers, reject force as an
option for preserving confederation.
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A. A Decentralized Confederation Including Quebec
Quebec desires increased autonomy; Western and Atlantic
Canada desire a larger voice at the centre, within the structure of
the central government; aboriginal Canadians desire greater selfgovernment and settlement of land claims; civil libertarians desire
maintenance, if not strengthening, of the Charter; and confirmed
centralists are loath to part with any significant portion of the
authority of the central government. In order to keep confederation
together, it may be necessary to address all of these concerns,
although, given their contradictory nature, it appears almost an
insoluble task. Compromise is essential, and compromise must occur
in three areas: the allocation of legislative authority between the
central government and the provinces, the nature and apportionment
of provincial representation within the institutions possessing federal
legislative authority, and the process by which the Constitution itself
may be altered.
1. Allocation of legislative authority between the provinces
and the central government
The central government ought to possess plenary and
exclusive authority over those aspects of government that will be
imperfectly accomplished by reasons of the externalities problem.
Aspects of government that are not plagued by this problem can
properly be left to the provinces or, alternatively, shared with the
central government. Accordingly, authority over such matters as
national defence, foreign policy, fiscal and monetary policy, customs
duties, external trade, and environmental or conservation matters
ought to be vested exclusively in the central government. The
remaining issues need not and, indeed, should not, be vested
exclusively in the central government. Given the necessity of
accommodating both Quebec's desire for significantly greater
autonomy and the preferences of others for retention of authority
within the central government, it is appropriate to grant to the
provinces and the central government concurrent authority over
these remaining heads of legislative jurisdiction. Of course, if
concurrent authority is granted, some principle must be used to
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decide which policy prevails in the event that the legislative choices
of the central government and the provinces conflict.
There are several options to resolve such conflicts. A
principle of federal supremacy could be adopted, as is the case
under the ConstitutionAct, 1867,50 the United States Constitution,51
and the Australian Constitution.5 2 The opposite principle, provincial
paramountcy, could be adopted. Finally, some intermediate position
could be adopted, such as deferring to the choice made by the
government which has first acted to occupy the field with respect
to which concurrent jurisdiction has been granted.
The first option is politically unworkable given Quebec's
insistence upon making its own choices in many legislative fields
which are currently assigned to the central government. The last
option is similarly unworkable since the federal government has
already occupied many of the jurisdictional areas which Quebec
desires to control. The principle of provincial paramountcy is not
necessarily as radical as it seems, for the principle only applies to
those areas of shared, or concurrent, legislative jurisdiction and, as
a practical matter, it can be expected that, apart from Quebec, few
provinces will actually act to strip the federal government of its
current authority.
For example, it is highly unlikely that
Newfoundland or Manitoba would act to assume responsibility for
unemployment insurance. Over time, to be sure, there might likely
emerge a pattern of more aggressive assertions of provincial
authority. That pattern is to be expected, however, and even

50 Supra, note 7, s. 95.
51 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

52 Commonwealth of Australia Consttudon Act (U.K.), 63 & 64 Vict., c. 12, s. 109
[hereinafter Ausralia Constitudon Act]: "When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of
the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the
inconsistency, be invalid." For a discussion of the operation of this provision, see R.D. Lumb

& K.W. Ryan, eds, The Constitution of the Commonwealth ofAustralia: Annotated (Sydney.
Butterworths, 1977) at 354-58.
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encouraged, if we are persuaded of the theoretical value of diverse
policy choices among constituent elements of a federal union.
Moreover, the idea of provincial legislative paramountcy is
not as new as it might first appear. The same principle is embodied
in section 33 of the Charter. the notwithstanding clause. Because
the advent of the Charter operated to impose new and additional
limits upon the permissible extent of provincial legislative authority,
the notwithstanding clause was included in the Charter as part of the
price of winning provincial consent for patriation of the
Constitution. 3 It is true that the notwithstanding clause also
operates partially to check the Charter's cession of authority from
the legislature to the courts and, thus, is part of the long-standing
Canadian and British tradition of parliamentary sovereignty.
Provincial legislative paramountcy does not partake of the same
tradition; rather, it lies far more in the Canadian tradition of altering
the nature of federalism to accommodate both the French linguistic
and cultural minority and to preserve confederation when faced with
strong centrifugal pressures. 54 It is thus both theoretically sensible5
5
and reasonably grounded in the Canadian tradition of federalism.
It is possible that the principle of provincial paramountcy
could be confined to Quebec. To do so, however, raises the
electrically charged spectre of "special status" for Quebec. It may
well be that such official, formal recognition of a preferred status for
Quebec would arouse substantial opposition in other provinces.
One of the lessons of Meech Lake may be that the federalism

See Mandel, supra, note 8 at 75: the provincial legislative override power "was
conceded by the federal government to the opposing provinces as the price for agreement to
the constitutional package." See also Cohen, supra, note 3 at 65: the notwithstanding clause
'Was inserted to satisfy the western premiers ...
and not to appease Quebec."
54 See Simeon & Robinson, supra, note 11 at 19-30, 249-38.
55

Provincial legislative paramountcy would require elimination of the Governor General's
power to disallow provincial legislation. See ConstitutonAct, 1867, supra, note 7, s. 90. This
was a frequently exercised power in the early years of confederation. See E.A. Forsey,
Freedom and Order (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974) and E.A. Forsey "Disallowance
of Provincial Acts, Reservation of Provincial Bills and Refusal of Assent by LieutenantGovernors Since 1867" (1938) 4 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 47. However, "[i]ts use today would
provoke intense resentment on the part of the provinces." See P.W. Hogg, ConstitutonalLaw
of Canada,2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 90.
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accommodations afforded to Quebec must be shared equally by the
remaining partners in confederation.
2. Regional representation at the centre: senate reform
The periphery of Canada - the West, the Maritime
provinces, Newfoundland, the North, and aboriginal peoples - all
desire a greater voice in the councils of the central government.
One way of responding to that desire is by making the Senate a
fully participating house of government and by altering the terms of
representation in the Senate. Senate reform is a difficult and
complex matter. If the Senate becomes an equal partner with the
House of Commons, an institutional threat is created to the fusion
of legislative power, executive power, and party discipline which
characterizes parliamentary democracy.
A counterweight is
established, the force of which is not immediately ascertainable. If
Senators are selected by the provinces rather than by the Prime
Minister, a further counterweight is created. If provinces have equal
representation in the Senate, it is possible that the will of the vast
majority (centred in Ontario and Quebec), as voiced by their MPS,
may be frustrated by the contrary votes of Senators from
Newfoundland, the Maritime provinces, Saskatchewan, and
Manitoba. Thus, Senate reform strikes at the heart of many parliamentary traditions. Moreover, the elimination of the traditional
Senate, with its lifetime appointments by the central government,
might produce changes in the type of person who sits in the Red
Chamber. It is, in a sense, the difference between Eugene Forsey
and Stanley Waters. Of course, it might also be the difference
between John Buchanan and, say, Preston Manning or Lucien
Bouchard.
Nevertheless, given the apparent necessity of responding to
the alienation of the periphery in order to win support for a plan of
devolution acceptable to Quebec, some type of Senate reform seems
essential.5 6 On the other hand, the Reform Party's "Triple E"
Senate (equal, effective, and elected) seems certain to arouse deep

56 See, generally, Kilgour, supra, note 6.
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opposition in Ontario and Quebec. The Quebec opposition might
be partially defused by the creation of a much broader range of
concurrent provincial and federal legislative jurisdiction, coupled
with the principle of provincial paramountcy, but the Ontario
opposition could be considerably more deep seated. Accordingly,
something other than the "Triple E" Senate must be created.
To respond to the desire for equal provincial representation
at the centre, each province could be allocated an equal number of
Senators, selected in whatever fashion each province devised.
Alberta might select its Senators by province-wide popular election,
as in essence it did with respect to Stanley Waters. New Brunswick
might choose to vest in its Premier the power of appointing its
Senators. British Columbia might prefer to let the Legislative
Assembly select Senators. Ontario might even desire to let the
Prime Minister appoint Ontario's Senators. In any case, Senators,
however selected, would serve for a term of years, rather than for
life.
The territories and the Aboriginal peoples of Canada should
be treated equally as, in essence, another province. For example, if
each province were allocated six Senators, the Yukon, N.W.T., and
the Aboriginal peoples of Canada would share six Senators.
Perhaps, in this example, two could be allocated to the Yukon, two
to the N.W.T., and two to the Aboriginal peoples. The method by
which the Aboriginal peoples would select their Senators will be
discussed shortly.
An additional block of Senators would be appointed for a
term of years by the Governor General. Hopefully, this power
would be exercised with the national interest in mind. At its best,
this block would be composed of the Eugene Forseys of Canada.
If these "national" Senators were indeed men and women of national
vision, there would be no skewing of the Senate in the direction of
central Canada. Rather, the provincially selected Senators would
perform in part the role of regional representatives, but, in company
with the federal appointees, also seek to act in the interest of the
entire nation.
The proportion of federally appointed to provincially selected
Senators is important. If the federally appointed block is too large
in relation to the provincially selected block, the equalizing effect of
the Senate will be sufficiently diluted that the peripheral provinces

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOi- 29 No. 4

will not support the plan. If the federally appointed block is too
small, Ontario and Quebec are likely to oppose the reform. A
federally appointed proportion of about 15 per cent of the whole
would produce a block that is twice as large as the contingent from
any single province, but not so large as to control the Senate if the
federal block were to act in concert with the Senators from Ontario
and Quebec. For example, if each province and the unit of the
Yukon, N.W.T., and native peoples were to have six Senators each,
the federally appointed block would consist of twelve Senators. This
hypothetical Senate would consist of seventy-eight members, sixtysix selected by the provinces, territories, and native peoples and
twelve appointed by the federal government.
Quebec should not fear this revitalized Senate, for its
jurisdiction would be shared with the House of Commons and
would, in any case, be subject to the provincial paramountcy
principle in the zone of concurrent jurisdiction. Since Ontario, New
Brunswick, and Nova Scotia were each willing voluntarily to
relinquish a substantial portion of their Senate seats in order to win
approval of Meech Lake, it is reasonable to expect that those
provinces might still be willing to make such a sacrifice for the
benefit of a continued, undivided Canada.5 7 The periphery would
not receive everything it desires in terms of Senate reform, but these
proposed alterations are an enormous improvement upon current
conditions.
From the perspective of native peoples, assured
representation in the Senate would be a tangible and symbolic
recognition of the status of Canada's natives as a founding people.
3. Aboriginal self-government
The meaning of Aboriginal self-government and the process
by which it is to be achieved are filled with contention. I do not
propose to attempt solution of those issues here; rather, I will only

57 Cohen, supra, note 3 at 248-51. However, the Ontario offer was made by the former
government of David Peterson. It is possible that Bob Rae's NDP government may not share
this view, although there is no reason to suspect that the Rae government is opposed.
Similarly, Nova Scotia's Conservative government has changed leaders, and thus, premiers, with

the appointment of John Buchanan to the Senate.
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sketch out a proposed relationship between self-governing Aboriginal
peoples and the federal government of Canada.
Each of the treaty bands and any other newly recognized
bands of natives could have representatives in a Council of the First
Nations. That Council would act as a parliament with respect to
matters of shared interest or jurisdiction among the various
Aboriginal peoples. It would also have the authority to select the
Aboriginal senators. In this way, there would be certainty that the
Aboriginal peoples of Canada would have a direct voice in the
Senate. It is, of course, also likely that one or more of the Senators
from the Yukon or the N.w.T. would be natives.
No doubt there could be some other arrangement for
selection of Aboriginal Senators. Indeed, the precise arrangements
are necessarily dependent upon the nature of the self-governance
provided to Canada's Aboriginal peoples and the settlement of
Aboriginal land claims. Since the land claims problems are largely
within provincial jurisdiction, it is possible that some bold and
imaginative steps by the existing central government might be
necessary to resolve the claims, institute self-governance, and
compensate the provinces in connection with the settlement of
native land claims. The entire issue is much too complicated for
solution in this forum. Let it suffice that, in order to address the
aspirations of native peoples, the constitutional revision should
assure a native voice at the centre and, at least, insure
commencement of a process for producing native self-governance
and land claims settlement.
4. Preservation of the Charter
One of the problems of the Meech Lake Accord was the
the "distinct society" clause would become a basis for
that
fear
differing judicial interpretation of the Charter in Quebec and the
rest of Canada. Many persons otherwise sympathetic to Quebec's
aspirations for greater autonomy and recognition opposed the
Accord out of fear that the Charter would thereby be irretrievably
weakened. Any new constitutional revision must account for this
concern.
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The advantage of the devolution described in this article is
that it would deal with specific legislative powers entirely on the
plane of the allocation of legislative authority between the central
government and the provinces. In short, it would not require
amendment of the Charter so much as it would require amendment
of sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act; 1867. Thus, the
Charter would continue to operate as an independent limit on the
power of both Parliament and the provincial legislatures. This fact
should not, however, arouse Quebec opposition to the scheme, for
Quebec (and all other provinces) would continue to be able to take
advantage of the notwithstanding clause to override the Charter
when politically acceptable to do so. This represents, of course, no
change from the present circumstance.
Zealous advocates of the Charter would probably prefer to
eliminate the notwithstanding clause altogether, but that option is
simply not possible in any scenario which seeks to keep Quebec in
confederation. If the ultimate result is indeed la fin du pays and
Quebec should leave, it is entirely possible that the Canada which
remains might then rethink the continued existence of this override
power. To propose such a step when there yet remains hope for
unbroken confederation is simply not responsible.
5. The amending process
One of the many defects of Meech Lake was the process by
which it was proposed and sought to be ratified. Conceived in
secret and presented as a non-negotiable holistic constitutional unit,
the Meech Lake Accord bore all the earmarks of a back-room deal
from which the public had been excluded as irrelevant. Perhaps,
because it dealt with constitutional revision after the Charter,the
people tended to regard this process as suspect. If the Charterwas
the guardian of popular liberty, was it really appropriate for its
amendment to be conducted by governmental elites acting in the
secret and haughty tradition of executive federalism? If the process,
though flawed, had produced an accord which deserved ratification,
was it appropriate that the requirement of unanimity prevented its
adoption? Unanimity is too difficult, perhaps impossible except with
respect to the trivial. Constitutions are expressions of the popular
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will and embodiments of the fundamental political aspirations of a
people. It is thus not appropriate to modify them in the same way
one might renegotiate the contract of a stellar athlete. It is
necessary to include the people of the nation or their
representatives in a fashion that is more than perfunctory.
In future, constitutional amendments might be adopted by
the approval of both houses of Parliament by a super-majority of
sixty to seventy per cent and ratification under the existing formula
of two-thirds of the provinces, composing at least fifty per cent of
the population of all provinces,5 8 or by ratification of three-fourths
of the provinces without regard to population. The effect of the
latter change would permit the periphery of the provinces to act
together to institute constitutional change, even over the objections
of Ontario and Quebec, assuming that the measure was popular
enough within Ontario and Quebec to earn the approval of a
sufficient number of central Canadian MPS in the House of
Commons. To ensure that Quebec would agree with this formula,
it would be necessary to retain the provisions of section 38 of the
ConstitutionAct, 1982 which provide that provinces may opt out of
constitutional amendments derogating from the legislative or other
powers of the provinces.5 9 Moreover, it might also be necessary to
retain the unanimity formula for amendments altering representation
in the House of Commons, language, and the composition of the
Supreme Court in order to protect all provinces, but especially
Quebec, from invidious alterations of the frame of government at
the hands of its fellow confederation partners. If this proposal
should succeed, it would probably also be necessary to include the
provincial legislative paramountcy principle as another aspect of the
constitution requiring unanimity for amendment.
Amendments would continue to be proposed initially in any
provincial legislative assembly or in either house of Parliament. c6 To
prevent the possibility of protracted and inconclusive debate on
58 ConstitutionAct 1982, supra, note 3, s. 38(1).

59 Ibid. s. 38(2): a province may expressly nullify any amendment, as to itself only, if
it is an amendment "that derogates from the legislative powers ... or any other rights or

privileges of the legislature or government of a province."
60

Ibid. s. 46(1).
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proposed amendments, the present three year time limit 61 should be
preserved, triggered by the first to occur of approval by both houses
of Parliament or the first provincial legislature to propose an
amendment. A shorter limit would be unduly restrictive upon
amendments arising in the provincial legislatures, for it would take
more time for the provinces to marshal support in Parliament and
other provinces for amendments originating from the "grass roots"
than from Parliament.
It might be prudent to consider modification of the amending
formula in another respect. The current provision requires consent
by "the legislative assemblies of ... the provinces." 62

Given the

strong party discipline that characterizes Canadian parliamentary
government, the present requirement is a practical invitation for
amendment by negotiation of constitutional change at secret
convocations of the first ministers. As Eugene Forsey declared, the
Meech Lake process has demonstrated that the "whole process of
constitutional amendment is wrong: out of date, undemocratic. The
Constitution belongs to the people, not the politicians. It is the
people, not the politicians, who should decide what goes in, what
stays in, what goes out."63 Forsey recommends the Australian
process,64 which requires a proposed amendment to receive a
majority of each house of Parliament, a majority of all electors
nationwide, and a majority of the electors within a majority of the
states. 65 However, as Forsey acknowledges, modification of the
Australian process is essential to address the uniquely Canadian
66
circumstance.
The principle of a popular referendum, both nationwide and
within each province, could easily be adopted as a mechanism that

61 Ibid- s. 39(2).
62 Ibid s. 38(1)(b).
63

E.A. Forsey, A Life On the Fringe: The Memoirs of Eugene Forsey (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1991) at 222-23.
64

ibid. at 223.

65

Australia ConstitutionAct, supra, note 52, s. 128. For a discussion of the operation
of this provision, see Lumb & Ryan, supra, note 52.
66 Forsey, supra, note 63 at 223.
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ensures popular involvement and approval. Another means to do so
could be a consitutional requirement that any vote in Parliament or
a provincial legislature concerning a constitutional amendment must
be a free vote. By some such mechanism, the iron party discipline
that makes executive federalism work would be broken. The Meech
Lake experience suggests that it should be. Quebec should not be
antagonistic to this formula, so long as the requirment of unanimity
prevails with respect to the items that are essential to preservation
of Quebec autonomy.
Of course, under the existing amending formula, unanimity
is required to alter the amending formula itself. The reality is that
if any major constitutional change is to occur, sufficient to keep
Quebec in confederation at a price acceptable to the remainder of
Canada, it will only occur by unanimous consent. With that as the
precondition for constitutional reconstruction, there is no reason to
eschew alteration of the amending formula simply because unanimity
is required.
6. Some concluding thoughts on devolution
The constitutional revision outlined here is one that is not
likely to please passionate centralists such as Pierre Trudeau. The
(perhaps unhappy) truth, however, is that Trudeau's vision of a
strong central government will not come to fruition in a bilingual
nation. It is ironic that, as will be discussed in the next section,
there is perhaps more hope for that vision in each of the unilingual
nations - Quebec and Canada - which may result from a rupture of

confederation.
However, centralists need not regard these devolutionary
arrangements with unmitigated distaste. There is nothing in this
proposal which coerces, or even encourages, provinces to exercise
paramount authority within the zone of concurrent legislative
authority shared with the central government. If the people of any
given province prefer Ottawa's legislative solutions, they need only
elect a provincial government committed to that point of view.
Indeed, the possible use of the provincial paramountcy power would
likely operate as a salutary curb upon the temptation of the central
government to adopt policies sufficiently inimical to the best
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interests of the provinces as to trigger contrary provincial legislation.
If it turns out that every province except Quebec prefers Ottawa's
legislation, there is no reason to expect that the provincial
paramountcy power will in fact radically alter the present allocation
of actual legislative authority.
When Sir John A. Macdonald dreamed of a postconfederation Canada, he saw it in terms of a strong central
government; 67 when Pierre Trudeau dreamed of a truly bilingual
Canada, he saw it in terms of a strong central government.
Macdonald's dream was partially realized; so, too, is the likely fate
of Trudeau's dream. The consolation for both may be the survival
of confederation.
That is no small consolation, for so long as
confederation's life continues there is always another night for the
next installment of the dream. Perhaps by granting Quebec and the
other provinces room to experiment, the ultimate result will be a
mutual recognition that each province's advantage is best secured by
collective action.
B. Devolution After Disunion
If Quebec does separate, it will be a painful rupture. There
may be euphoria in Quebec, and even among those of ill-will or
ignorance in the remainder of Canada, but before long there will
be a sense of loss, probably felt more deeply in Canada than
Quebec. After all, the history of les habitants is also a part of the
heritage of Albertans as well as les Qudb6cois. In that mourning will
come reflection, re-evaluation, and, ultimately, change. If the failure
to preserve confederation will have been due in part to Canada's
unwillingness to accept a substantially more decentralized federal
union, there is little reason to assume that Canadians will change
their minds on this point when it no longer matters. Accordingly,
it is far more likely that a Canada without Quebec will assume an
even more centralized shape, acquired in part to assure that the
Canada which remains does not fracture further.

67 See supra note 9.
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Additional centralization in Canada without Quebec cannot
occur simply because Ontario might deem it desirable. In order for
more authority to vest in Ottawa, it will be essential to respond to
the concerns of the periphery: Atlantic Canada, the West, and the
North. As we have seen, these regions desire a larger voice at the
centre. Smarting from the wounds of one rupture, Ontario would
likely regard it essential to accommodate the desires of the
periphery. Having done so, it is entirely possible that the notwithstanding clause would disappear from the Charter,the constitutional
amending formula would be altered to make amendment easier, and
such foreign inventions as the direct legislative initiative might creep
into Canadian politics. The counterweight to centralization would
likely be greater popular accountability of legislators. Thus, it is not
unthinkable that a Canada without Quebec might develop weaker
party discipline, reflecting greater popular accountability of ,s
directly to their constituents, independent of the party caucus. An
unlikely extreme might even be the ultimate abandonment of the
parliamentary system, replaced instead by the American troika of a
directly elected chief executive, bicameral legislature, and Supreme
Court wielding with finality the power of constitutional judicial
review. If this prospect is too awful for Canadians to contemplate,
perhaps it is wise to think of the possibility now, while there is still
time to achieve rapprochement with Quebec.
IV. CONCLUSION
One central fact of political union is that some regions or
groups within a nation will tend to dominate the political process,
sometimes to the point that a disproportionate share of the benefits
of political union will be captured, leaving less politically adept
regions and groups with a disproportionate share of the social and
economic costs of the captured benefits. When these pressures
become unbearable, political fission results, offering the possibility of
a dramatic alteration of the previously inequitable arrangement.
In those societies where political dominance by a segment of
the whole is not so clear or the arrangements equitable enough to
secure continued adherence to the nation, these pressures are
containable and do not lead to rupture. Indeed, there are even
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cases where nations perceive their individual lots to be bettered by
union with other nations. Though it may seem paradoxical, precisely
that phenomenon is occurring within the European Economic
Community (EEC), as internal barriers to the movement of people
and goods collapse in 1992. This political fusion is an economic
one, motivated by a desire to rationalize a continental economy that
already exists. A similar desire brought Americans together in
Philadelphia in 1787, and the resulting American federal union, at
least in its original intended form, was much closer to the economic
union being forged by the EEC than today's highly centralized United
States, where the congressional power to regulate interstate
commerce, for example, has become a plastic device to regulate
virtually any aspect of American life.68 The EEC would do well to
stop with economic union and let the diverse societies of Europe
reach different conclusions on other aspects of life. The United
States Congress might also contemplate the institutional pressures
created by continuation of its passion for national regulation of
increasing aspects of life. Though state sovereignty has a bad
historical pedigree in the American experience, that alone cannot
contain the pressures created by ignoring local desires with respect
to local problems.
Securing local control over local issues requires governmental
structures that vest considerable autonomy in local units of
government. Moreover, exercise of the powers of the central
government ought to be conditioned in some fashion upon the
consent of the internal constituent groups of the nation. Through
the current unrest in federal systems around the world, we will see
new solutions being tried. Whether such solutions are as radical as
secession or as mild as supermajority voting requirements for central
government action, they are all occasioned by the simple and eternal
desire for greater human autonomy. Governments often forget and
need continuously to be reminded that they are the servants, not the
masters, of the people.

68 See Perezv. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), establishing that Congress may regulate
any class of activity under its commerce power, so long as it has made a rational judgment
that the regulated activity "affects" interstate commerce; Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111
(1942), holding that Congress possessed authority under its commerce power to regulate the
amount of wheat grown for one's personal consumption.

1991]

Devolution or Disunion

The Canadian crisis is as much one of federalism as it is of
culture and language. For a bilingual, bicultural confederation to
continue, it is necessary to devolve power from the centre to the
provinces. The trick is to do so in a fashion that will simultaneously
achieve political acceptance throughout Canada and will not weaken
the bonds of union, permitting the constituent elements of the
Canadian federal system wholly to depart from their orbits.
I have sketched out such a formula, the essence of which is
the identification of those powers of government which must remain
exclusively central and the granting of all other powers concurrently
to the central government and the provinces, with the explicit
recognition that in cases of conflict the provincial legislative choices
Exclusively federal powers are those which are so
prevail.
susceptible to the externalities problem that they must be removed
from the temptation of local politicians to manipulate them for local
gain produced at a cost borne by others. Additional elements of the
formula are provision of a greater regional voice in the centre,
through senate reform (though not of the variety desired by the
Reform Party), aboriginal self-governance and representation of both
the native peoples and the territories in the Senate, and alteration
of the amending formula to make constitutional amendment both
easier and more controllable by the people's immediate political
representatives. Whether this will prove efficacious is, of course,
The risks are high; the consequences of
wholly unknown.
miscalculation enormous.
In another context, following the 1980 sovereignty
referendum, a defeated Ren6 LUvesque could only murmur "a la
prochaine.''69 This may be the last time to preserve a united
Canada. It is a moment which must not be squandered.

69 Cohen, supra, note 3 at xi.

